Towards a comprehensive policy for electricity from renewable energy: Designing for social welfare  by Iychettira, Kaveri K. et al.
Applied Energy 187 (2017) 228–242Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Applied Energy
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/ locate/apenergyTowards a comprehensive policy for electricity from renewable energy:
Designing for social welfarehttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2016.11.035
0306-2619/ 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
⇑ Corresponding author at: Delft University of Technology, The Netherlands.
E-mail address: kaveri.kariappa.i@gmail.com (K.K. Iychettira).Kaveri K. Iychettira a,b,⇑, Rudi A. Hakvoort a, Pedro Linares b, Rob de Jeu a
aDelft University of Technology, The Netherlands
b Pontifical University of Comillas, Spain
h i g h l i g h t s
 RES-E support policy design space is systematically explored using ‘design elements’ and agent based modelling
 Bounded rationality is incorporated in investment decisions to reflect true uncertainty.
 Uncertainties significantly impact design elements, and corresponding RES-E schemes.
 Design elements matter, irrespective of the RES-E scheme.a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 1 July 2016
Received in revised form 6 November 2016
Accepted 9 November 2016
Available online 22 November 2016
Keywords:
Electricity market
RES-E policy analysis
Agent based modelling
Policy designa b s t r a c t
The governance of renewable electricity in Europe beyond 2020 is still uncertain. The only certain aspects
are that national level targets will be abolished beyond 2020, and that most renewable electricity support
schemes will take the form of competitive bidding. The objective of this paper is to assess the impact of
policy choices, the so-called Design Elements, related to renewable electricity support schemes on social
welfare. Presently, simulation and optimisation models are commonly applied for assessing the value of
policy choice. Typically however, such models do not account for bounded rationality, and true uncer-
tainty in investment decisions, and assume perfect information. However such assumptions can hardly
be expected to hold in the real-world, especially in sectors where investment decisions which happen
under knowledge of past trends and imperfect foresight, are a major determinant of welfare outcomes.
The approach employed in this work is fundamentally different in that firstly, there is a shift from a ‘pol-
icy’ view to a ‘design element’ based approach of renewable electricity support assessment, and secondly
investment decisions are simulated using agent-based modelling. We find that the combination of design
elements that provides the highest increase in social welfare is the quantity warranty, with electricity
market price accounted for ex-ante, and with technology specificity. Given the current debate on the gov-
ernance of renewable energy generation in the European Union beyond 2020, the present paper offers
guidance to policy makers and analysts who would like a better understanding of the relationship
between policy design and social welfare.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an openaccess article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation and research objective
In a recent article on the transition towards a green economy
David Newbery [2] argues for the merits of a renewable support
policy comprising of a Contract for Differences (CfD) with a stan-
dard Feed-in-Tariff (FiT) as opposed to a Premium FiT, proposed
by the 2015 EU Energy Union Package [3]. It has been more adecade since the first Renewable Energy Sources (RES) directive,
and the debate on how best to design support for renewable
electricity is still raging. The European commission only specifies
that there will be no national level targets beyond 2020, and that
most Renewable Energy Sources for Electricity (RES-E support
schemes should take the form of competitive bidding. It still
remains to be seen whether these choices will lead to the triad
of competition, sustainability, and affordability being achieved in
the energy sector.
Since the first RES-E Directive was released in 2001, there have
been numerous works that have evaluated renewable support
schemes from theoretical and empirical standpoints; refer for
Nomenclature
Abbreviations
NPV Net Present Value
WACC Weighted Average Cost of Capital
WACCrev WACC adjusted for risk aversion
Subscripts
 asterisk in the exponent denotes equilibrium values.
g power plant index
rep repetition index per scenario
s segment index
t time step in years
Symbols
ag;s available capacity of power plant g, in segment s [in
MW]
CFOp;g expected cash flow for power plant g, during operation
[in Eur]
fcg;tþn fixed costs of power plant g, in time t + n [in Eur/MW h]
Ig investment cost of power plant g in t [in Eur]
Kg nominal capacity of power plant g [in MW]
n number of years ahead of current tick, for which value is
being computed
nrep number of repetitions per scenario [1]
ntick number of ticks per repetition [1]
ps;tþn electricity spot market price for segment s, estimated at
time t, for a period n years ahead
paymentg;t payment of subsidy to RE producer for plant g at time
t [in Eur]
rD rate of debt
rEb basic rate of equity
rEp price risk component of rate of equity
rE rate of equity
rg;tþn running hours of power plant g, at time t + n [in hours]
rGent total renewable energy generation at time t [in MW h]
tb power plant construction time
tD power plant depreciation time
targett total target for renewable energy generation at time t
[in MW h]
vcg;tþn variable costs of power plant g, in time t + n [in Eur/
MW h]
Xanteg total subsidy per MW h of generation for plant g, dis-
counted to present value [in Eur/MW h]
Xpostg total cost per MW h of plant g, discounted to present va-
lue [in Eur/MW h]
K.K. Iychettira et al. / Applied Energy 187 (2017) 228–242 229instance [4,5,1,6,7]. Such literature so far on renewable support
schemes has mainly focussed on comparing different policies1 or
support schemes 2 that have been implemented in various member
states of the European Union (EU). The key here however is not a
choice between policy A or B, but between how either policy instru-
ment should be designed. This allows the policy maker such as the
European Commission to decide what design features are essential
in an RES-E scheme, rather than propose an entire scheme itself. This
idea has been upheld by several authors such as [8–10].
We propose that any RES-E policy can be broken down into a
closed set of components that are common to all renewable elec-
tricity support schemes. We refer to these components as ‘design
elements’; the design elements now form the smallest level of
analysis. The objective of this research is to assess the impact of
design elements of Renewable Energy Source Electricity (RES-E)
support schemes on a single (isolated, uncongested) region mod-
elled approximately similar to the power sector in the Netherlands,
using a long-term agent-based model of the electricity market,
with endogenous investment. We introduce the design elements
in Section 2.1, and demonstrate that it is possible to model ele-
ments individually in Section 2.3. The policies are then modelled
as combinations of design elements. The design elements analysed
are price warranty versus quantity warranty, electricity market rev-
enue accounted for ex-post or ex-ante, and technology specificity ver-
sus technology neutrality. The performance indicators in this study
are effectiveness of policy in terms of cost and target achievement,
and social welfare and distributional implications on producer,
consumer, and the government.
The following subsection comprises of a review of literature in
the field, and outlines how this work contributes to literature. This
is followed by Section 2, which includes a detailed description of
the methodology used: the design elements considered, the model,
the hypotheses and experiment design. The subsequent section1 Policy is a general term used to describe a formal decision or a plan of action
adopted by an actor, such as the government, to achieve a particular goal.
2 The word policy is used interchangeably with the word scheme in this work.includes the results and their discussion. This is then followed by
the conclusion.1.2. Literature review
The current work relates to two strands of literature, one where
RES-E schemes have been analysed, and the other where they have
been modelled.
RES-E schemes have been compared analysed at great depth
since the first RES-E directive. Recent literature in the field still
indicates that policy comparisons dominate the field [2,11–14].
Nevertheless, perceiving RES-E support schemes in terms of design
elements has been done qualitatively before by some authors. For
instance, [15] and the beyond2020 project by [16] present a list of
design elements for RES-E support schemes. Del Rio and Linares
(2014) [8] provide an in-depth review of auction schemes for
renewable electricity around the world; they identify and assess
design elements of such auctions and propose a coherent integra-
tion of several design elements to improve auction designs. The
design elements described in the above papers however are not
common across all policies, thus still making them policy-
specific; the disadvantage being that it is not possible to objec-
tively analyse the impacts of specific features of a policy on the
system. Also importantly, all the aforementioned works only qual-
itatively discuss design elements, but provide no quantitative anal-
ysis regarding their long-term dynamic effects and welfare
distributional implications.
There have been several quantitative modelling efforts to eval-
uate the effectiveness of RES-E support schemes. Capros et al. [17]
provide a detailed description of seven large scale EU energy econ-
omy models that have been used to model decarbonisation path-
ways. Works which use models that have simulated and
quantitatively compared different RES-E support policies in some
detail include the Green-X model [18], the REBUS (Renewable
Energy Burden Sharing) model [19], the PERSEUS-RES-E
(Programme-package for Emission Reduction Strategies in Energy
Use and Supply-Certificate Trading) model by [20], and an
230 K.K. Iychettira et al. / Applied Energy 187 (2017) 228–242extended version of the TIMES-D (The Integrated MARKAL-EFOM
System) model by [11], henceforth referred to as the TIMES-D-
Extension Model.
In terms of the research objective and experiment design, the
work using TIMES-D-extension model is the most comparable to
the current one. Like the others, it compares support schemes
themselves - the Feed in Tariff scheme to a Tradable Green Certifi-
cate mechanism. However, like this work, it comprises of a long-
term evaluation of the support schemes, under design criteria
which include technology specificity and technology neutrality.
Hence, further comparisons to literature will primarily be limited
to the TIMES-D-extension model. The TIMES-D-extension model
is a partial equilibrium energy system model, which employs an
objective function representing the total discounted system costs
across the years 2000–2050,
These models can be classified into one of the three trends in
electricity market modelling: optimisation models, equilibrium
models, and simulation models [21]. Optimisation models include
both deterministic, and stochastic programming. Typically, with
respect to investment decisions, the aforementioned models
assume perfect foresight, and perfect competition. Some models
use stochastic parameters and/or scenario analysis to account for
certain uncertainties. However, even these scenarios or probability
distributions need to be estimated by the analyst.
Such methods imply that investment decisions are made under
the premise of minimisation of system expenditure across time. As
[20,22] point out however, such assumptions imply that capacity
or production decisions can be taken instantaneously, under condi-
tions of free entry and exit. These assumptions can hardly be
expected to hold in the real-world, especially in sectors where
investment decisions, which happen under knowledge of past
trends, and imperfect foresight, are a major determinant of welfare
outcomes.
1.3. From scenario analysis of policies to design elements
In a scenario analysis, the uncertainty about parameters or
components of the system is modelled by a small number of ver-
sions of sub-problems derived from an underlying optimisation
problem. These correspond to different scenarios, suggesting some
kind of limited representation of information on the uncertain ele-
ments or how such information may evolve.
The critical question then is how to determine which compo-
nents of the system comprise each scenario, and why a certain
set of scenarios are sufficient. So far, in modelling studies related
to renewable electricity support schemes such as those aforemen-
tioned, different scenarios are formed by established current poli-
cies in their entirety. In other papers, variations of designs within
one single established policy are analysed. However, it is critical
to note that two seemingly different policies can be designed such
that they have an equivalent effect on the market. For instance, a
Tradable Green Certificate (TGC) scheme with long term contracts
resembles a tender. A Feed in Premium (FiP) scheme with long
term contracts resembles a Feed in Tariff (FiT) [16]. The underlying
idea therefore is that it is not the policy but the design element
which is the vital component of analysis. In effect, the decision
variables are no longer the policies, but the design elements that
they are composed of.
The design element approach allows us to systematically
explore the entire RES-E policy design space, even creating new
policies that have not been implemented before. More importantly,
it allows us assess the impacts of a specific feature of a policy on
the system. This feature could be technology specificity, price vs.
quantity warranty, or type of price setting. With such information,
it is possible to advice the EC on what design features are essential
in an RES-E scheme, rather than proposing an entire scheme itself.1.4. Choice of modelling approach
The methodology and work presented herewith is fundamen-
tally different from the aforementioned works in two main aspects.
One is a shift from a policy view to a design element based view of
RES-E support assessment. The second fundamental difference lies
in the methodological approach employed in this work, Agent-
Based Modelling (ABM). ABM is recognised as a methodology that
provides a framework to model agents with bounded rationality,
their interactions with other agents, and the environment around
them, as [23–25] have explained.
The ‘base model’ employed, EMLab, consists of generation com-
panies as agents who individually make investment decisions. The
investment decisions of the past affect those of the future, and
agents make decisions under imperfect foresight. Agents create
their own forecasts using regression techniques of past values of
demand and fuel price trends, much like in the real-world, to arrive
at endogenous investment patterns. Such real world representa-
tions help analyse how different designs of RES-E support affect
investment incentives, and consequently affect the energy transi-
tion. The base model, on which this work has been built, is
described in detail in Section 2.2, and with flowchart in Appendix
B, and is represented in Fig. 1. The design elements, and conse-
quently the RES-E policies, that have been modelled as part of
the current work, are described in Section 2.3.
This approach is markedly different from the aforementioned
modelling methods because of the following reasons. Firstly, since
each agent makes individual investment decisions based only
under current knowledge of the system, we implement bounded
rationality; this often leads to sub-optimal choices when assessed
ex-post, much like reality. Secondly, in equilibrium models, typi-
cally the policies are modelled close to how they work in theory.
It is implicitly assumed that the policy in place would achieve its
target, as modelled. However, this method does not help identify
reasons that a policy would not work as intended; interpretation
is left to the analyst. Including uncertainties and bounded rational-
ities in the model, helps pin-point which micro decisions lead to
which macro outcomes in the model. Thirdly, unlike optimisation
models, the focus of our model is not a final minimum cost state,
but to analyse dynamics in the path of an energy transition, while
including specific uncertainties.
Such modelling takes us a step closer to representing the real
world. The base model has so far been applied to study long term
dynamics of the electricity market in relation to security of supply
and carbon trading, in various publications [27,26,28].2. Methodology
2.1. Design elements: an introduction
We define design elements as a closed and complete set of attri-
butes of an RES-E policy. The attributes used to characterise an
RES-E support policy have been chosen based on the work of the
Beyond 2020 Project by [16,15], and adapted for this work. It is
proposed that these design elements can be identified in any
RES-E policy; conversely, any RES-E policy can be represented in
terms of these design elements.
The theoretical basis for the design element approach to policy
analysis is based on a combination of institutional analysis as well
as an empirical study of a variety of existing RES-E schemes in
Western Europe. In this work we model and analyse three specific
design elements; they have been presented in Table 1. The full list
of design elements are presented in A.3.
The foremost of the design elements analysed is price or quan-
tity warranty of the commodity being regulated. The choice of
Fig. 1. High level diagram of behaviour of agents and their interaction with environment in EMLab. Adapted from [26].
Table 1
Policy design elements for stimulation of RES-E in Europe.
Design Element Definition
Quantity Warranty or
Price Warranty
A mandated quantity of electricity supply or
consumption from RES technologies or a mandated
price per unit of electricity generated from RES
Setting of electricity
market price
Revenue from the electricity market can be
accounted for ex ante, or ex post
Technology Specificity
vs. Neutrality
The design element which specifies which
technologies are eligible for a certain support
scheme
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uncertainties existing in the system, and the shapes, to the extent
they can be determined, of the cost and benefit curves. The design
element regarding whether market revenue accounted for ex-post
versus ex-ante could have significant welfare impacts based on
uncertainties regarding future forecasts, and is little studied in lit-
erature. Technology-specificity versus technology-neutrality is
another feature which could have appreciable implications on
social welfare distribution.
2.2. Description of existing model
This section briefly describes the ’base model’, on which the
design elements are built. The main agents are electricity genera-
tion companies; they make short term decisions such as bidding
competitively into the electricity spot market, purchasing fuel,
and long term decisions such as investing in new power plants.
They affect the model environment with such decisions, and conse-
quently their own state (e.g. cash position). The base model
includes two main algorithms: one, an electricity spot market
clearing algorithm, and two, the investment algorithm. A brief
description of the two algorithm are presented below. They are
complemented by flowcharts in Appendix B. A much more detailed
version of the base model is presented in of the doctoral thesis by
[26].
2.2.1. Market clearing algorithm
A uniform electricity market clearing has been implemented
algorithmically. The load duration curve for a full year is repre-
sented in terms of 20 load-segments, where each load segment isa demand (in MW) and time (in hours) pair. For each load segment,
the bids (price, quantity pairs) from the energy producer are
stacked according to their merit order, and a uniformmarket clear-
ing price is determined at the intersection of demand and supply
for that load segment.2.2.2. Investment behaviour
Each agent makes decisions about investments of plants by
forecasting demand and fuel prices based on past data, and thereby
estimating their own merit order, and future electricity prices
ps;tþn. Producers differ from each other in terms of the initial mix
of their generation portfolios, and the order in which they take
investment decisions. Each agent considers demand and fuel price
data of the previous 5 years to create geometric regression trends
for the future. The future time point, n, for which they make invest-
ment decisions is 2 years ahead. They do have perfect knowledge
only about investments made thus far by the other agents, and
when they will come online. That the agents have a limited knowl-
edge of the future is an important feature of the model, as it leads
to sub-optimal decisions being made. This corresponds to reality
where expectations often differ from actual outcomes, as explained
by [27].
Based on the expected electricity market prices, marginal costs
vcg;tþn,the fixed operation and maintenance cost fcg;tþn, segment-
dependent available capacity of power plant ag;s, and the expected
running hours rs;g;tþn,which is also calculated from the expected
electricity prices and marginal cost per segment, the cash flow
for reference year t þ n of operation for the power plant is calcu-
lated as follows.
CFOp;g ¼ CInflowOp;g  COutflowOp;g
¼ Rsps;tþn  rs;g;tþn  ag;s
 Rsvcg;tþn  rs;g;tþn  ag;s þ fcg;tþn
  ð1Þ
The economic viability of each power plant of capacity Kg is
then assessed with initial capital costs,Ig , over the building period
0 . . . tb , and the service period, tb þ 1 . . . tb þ tD. TheWeighted Aver-
age Cost of Capital (WACC) is used as the discount rate. The Net
Present Value (NPV), which discounts all future costs and benefits
into present value, is calculated by each energy producer for each
technology in order to make an investment decision:
Fig. 2. Relationship between base model and RES-E schemes.
4 The duration of contract is 20 years.
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Ig
ð1þWACCÞtþR
tbþtD
t¼tbþ1

CInflowOp;g
ð1þWACCrev Þt
COutflowOp;gð1þWACCÞt
 !,
Kg
ð2Þ
WACC ¼ rD  ðD=VÞ þ rEb  ðE=VÞ ð3Þ
WACCrev ¼ rD  ðD=VÞ þ ðrEb þ rEpÞ  ðE=VÞ ð4Þ
where D is the debt-value, E is the equity-value, V is the total value.
The debt equity ratio is set at 70:30. In Eq. (2), risk aversion to price
volatility is incorporated in the inflow or revenue component by an
adjustedWACC, called theWACCrev . The rate of equity component in
the WACCrev , described in Eq. (4), rE, is expressed as the sum of a
basic equity rate, rEb set to 11%, and a price risk equity rate, rEp
set to 3%.The cost of debt, rD is set at 5.5%. This is based on data from
the [30].
Each agent thus iteratively computes the NPV for every technol-
ogy, and invests in the technology with the highest positive NPV.
This algorithm is presented in Fig. B.9b. This description so far
forms the base model, on which RES-E support design elements
have been built. The conceptual model of RES-E policies is
explained below. The model is implemented in Java and the source
code is openly accessible.3
2.3. Modelling of design elements
In the previous section, the main algorithms of EMLab have
been described. In this section we present the core of the contribu-
tion of this paper, the modelling of RES-E schemes in the form of
their design elements.
The design elements are modelled such that, when presented as
an RES-E scheme, they create incentives for agents to invest in
specific technologies. The algorithmic relationship between the
RES-E schemes and the investment behaviour is indicated with
the help of a flowchart in Fig. 2.
As far as modelling is concerned, an RES-E scheme is repre-
sented as an entity with a set of properties, and related methods,
much like a class in object-oriented programming. The design ele-
ments identified in the previous step together make up the proper-
ties of the RES-E class. This is represented in Fig. 3. The processes or
behaviours related to the different properties are the methods of
the class.3 https://github.com/Kaveri3012/emlab-generation/tree/feature/SocialWelfare
Analysis.2.3.1. Design Element 1: price versus quantity warranty
This design element can be defined as a mandated quantity or
price for electricity supply or consumption from RES technologies.
It is modelled as two separate algorithms, their descriptions follow.
2.3.1.1. Quantity warranty scheme. The quantity warranty scheme,
is algorithmically implemented in the form of yearly auctions, as
per the following steps.
1. Quantitative targets for renewable energy generation are
exogenously for each year set by extrapolating the targets men-
tioned in the National Renewable Energy Action Plan [31]. This
comprises the demand-side of the auction.
2. The quantity warranty is implemented as a sealed-bid uniform
price auction, for contracts that span a pre-decided period of
years,4 like a tender.5
3. Depending on the specification of design element 3, technology
specificity, annual auctions are organised for each technology
separately or for all technologies simultaneously.
4. Producer agents submit bids each year for new projects, by
computing the expected cost and benefit of the project either
by Eq. (5) or (7), depending on whether the scheme is designed
ex-post or ex-ante.
5. The payments are then made annually for the winning bids, for
the duration of the contract period (20 years) according to Eq.
(6) or (9).
2.3.1.2. Price warranty scheme.
1. The price warranty is computed by matching the exogenously
specified inelastic target on the demand side, with the (cost,
quantity) pairs on the supply side.6
2. The regulator agent depending on specification of design ele-
ment 3, computes a price warranty for each eligible technology,
or a single price for all technologies if the scheme is technology
neutral.
3. The price, with ex-ante considerations of electricity market
price, is computed as per Eqs. (5) and (6), and with ex-post
considerations of electricity market price is computed as per
Eqs. (7) and (9).5 This step is approximately modelled on the French EOLE auctions [32].
6 It is assumed that the regulator has full knowledge of power plant costs and
realistic technology potentials.
Fig. 3. Specification of Java class structures of Agents and RES-E scheme using design elements.
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into published revenue from the applicable subsidy schemes.
Payments are made annually till the end of the contract dura-
tion (20 years) according to Eq. (6) or (9).
2.3.2. Design Element 2: ex-ante versus ex-post
The contract can be designed in a way that for computing the
subsidy i.e., the additional remuneration for RES-E technologies,
revenue from the electricity market is accounted for either ex-
ante (before the actualisation of electricity prices) or ex-post
(when the electricity price is known). This process of organizing
the remuneration takes place in two steps. A first step is where
supply and demand are matched, to arrive at a quantity X, and a
second step where payment is made to the energy producer, based
on the amount of generation each year. It is important to note that
this quantity X holds different meanings in ex-post and ex-ante
versions of remuneration.
2.3.2.1. Ex-ante. In this version, the revenue from the electricity
market is taken into account ex-ante, for the calculation of the
remuneration. In the first step, a quantity Rt¼0...d
Xanteg
ð1þWACCÞt equivalent
to the total subsidy required by a plant is computed. As can be seen
in Eq. (5), this quantity is computed as the discounted value of
investment cost plus operating cost minus estimated revenue.
The annual payment to eligible power plants is organised by Eq.
(6). This way, the risk of volatility of future electricity prices is rel-
egated to the producer.
Rt¼0...d
Xanteg
ð1þWACCÞt ¼ R
tb
t¼0
Ig
ð1þWACCÞt
 RtbþtDt¼tbþ1
CInflowOp;g
ð1þWACCrevÞt
þ COutflowOp;gð1þWACCÞt
 !
ð5Þ
paymentg;t ¼ RgRsðXanteg  ag;sÞ where t 2 ftb . . . tDg ð6Þ7 In order to represent variability of load across the year, the load duration curve is
divided into segments; each segment being a (load, time) pair value, and each
segment is cleared separately.2.3.2.2. Ex-post. In this version the electricity market prices are
accounted for after the prices have been realised in actuality. Since
the subsidy is only paid once the electricity price is known, the
only quantity that needs to be published ahead is the ‘total cost
per unit’ of the technology, variously known as the ‘base cost’ or
‘strike price’ in the different support schemes that implement ex-
post remuneration. In the model, this is implemented in two steps;
in the first step, a quantity equivalent to the total discounted cost
(fixed and variable) of a plant, represented by the term
Rt¼0...d
Xpostg
ð1þWACCÞt is calculated in Eq. (7). In the second step, the annual
payment to eligible power plants is organised by Eq. (9). This shifts
the price related uncertainty and risk from the electricity producer
to the government.
Rt¼0...d
Xpostg
ð1þWACCÞt ¼ R
tb
t¼0
Ig
ð1þWACCÞt þ R
tbþtD
t¼tbþ1
COutflowOp;g
ð1þWACCÞt ð7Þwhere
COutflowg;tþn ¼ Rðvcg;tþnÞ  rs;g;tþn  ag;sÞ  Rfcg;tþn ð8Þ
paymentg;t ¼ RgRsðXpostg  ps Þ  ag;s where t 2 ftb . . . tDg ð9Þ
The risk faced by the energy producer is lower in the ex-post sce-
nario, since there is no price risk in the revenue component of the
NPV. This is represented in the following manner. The rate of equity
component, which indicates price risk, rEp in Eq. (4), is set to 0%.
2.3.3. Design Element 3: technology specificity versus neutrality
In the technology-specific scenarios, a different quantity X is cal-
culated for each technology. When technology specificity is applied
with quantity warranty of design element 1, a different auction is
cleared for each technology by the regulator agent, resulting in
one X for each technology type, where supply and demand meet.
Inelastic RES-E production targets (demand-side) are set for each
technology type at each tick exogenously. Producer agents com-
pute their offer prices for each available technology-type in the
model, either by Eq. (7) or (5), and submit it to the auction. In a
price warranty scheme, the regulator agent is assumed to have
the same information on costs, and assumptions regarding dis-
count rates, as the producer agent. Again, the regulator agent con-
sequently determines the quantity X for each technology.
In the technology-neutral scenarios, a single quantity X is calcu-
lated irrespective of the technology type. In a quantity warranty
scheme, a single auction is conducted for all technologies. In a price
warranty scheme, the regulator agent is assumed to have informa-
tion regarding technology costs and technology potentials. With
this knowledge and given the exogenously set RES-E target, the
agent constructs a supply-demand curve, and computes a single
quantity X for all technologies.
2.4. Input data: case of the Netherlands
A single (isolated, uncongested) electricity market is consid-
ered, with four energy producer companies, whose initial portfolio
is based approximately on the existing generation mix in the
Netherlands. However, to ensure focus on assessing RES-E design
elements, the model is simplified such that all conventional capac-
ity in the Netherlands is represented by the Combined Cycle Gas
Turbine (CCGT) technology. Given recent Dutch laws regarding
the phasing out of coal, see [33], and equivocal opinions on nuclear
technology, refer [34], it is reasonable to assume that a significant
part of the conventional generation mix will be dominated by gas
technologies. Along with CCGT, three renewable technologies are
considered, and assumptions regarding their characteristics are
described in Table C.6. The intermittent nature of renewable gener-
ation sources is represented by hourly availability factors, which
are then aggregated to segment-based7 availability factors. The data
Table 2
Base case experiment set – naming convention.
RES-E Policy
Scenario
Name
Design Element 1:
Warranty type
Design Element 2:
Price Setting
Design Element 3:
Tech Neutral vs
Specific
P_Ante Price Warranty Ex_Ante Neutrality
P_Post Price Warranty Ex_Post Neutrality
P_AnteTS Price Warranty Ex_Ante Specificity
P_PostTS Price Warranty Ex_Post Specificity
Q_Ante Quantity Warranty Ex_Ante Neutrality
Q_Post Quantity Warranty Ex_Post Neutrality
Q_AnteTS Quantity Warranty Ex_Ante Specificity
Q_PostTS Quantity Warranty Ex_Post Specificity
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from [35]. The model runs for 40 ticks, with each tick representing
a year starting from 2014.
The targets and realistic potentials for renewable technologies
have been set based on data from [37,37], and extrapolated, as
described in Appendix C.1. Fuel prices of natural gas and electricity
demand, are modelled as stochastic trends, using a triangular dis-
tribution to determine the year-on-year growth rate. The assump-
tions for modal growth rate, and its upper and lower bounds are
summarised in Table C.5. The initial load duration function is based
on 2014 ENTSO-E data for Netherlands. A value of lost load of 2000
Eur/MW h has been used for this work, based on [39–40].2.5. Experimental design
2.5.1. The base case set
The fundamental premise of this work is that design elements
are the building blocks which allow the policy analyst to create
all possible types of RES-E support schemes. Thus all combinations
of the three design elements introduced above, where each design
element can hold two values, lead to 23 RES-E policy scenarios. This
is shown in Table 2.
If one were to draw parallels between some of the scenarios and
actually implemented schemes, P_Ante would be akin to the Ger-
man Feed-in-Tariff scheme, P_Post to the German Feed-in-
Premium, and Q_PostTS is comparable to the UK’ s contract-for-
differences scheme, where ex-post contracts are allocated on a
technology-specific basis, via auctions, and the SDE+ in the Nether-
lands is similar to Q_Post, where technology neutral auctions are
held for ex-post type of contracts. However, not all RES-E policy
scenarios exist currently or have been implemented in reality, so
names for such policies do not exist. Also, policies with the same
names are implemented differently in different countries. For this
reason and to keep intact the relationship between each policy sce-
nario, and the design elements that it is composed of, we propose a
naming convention as provided in Table 2.2.5.2. Sensitivity analysis
The impacts of the design element ex-ante vs ex-post inter alia
depends on how well the expectations of producers’ electricity
price match actual prices. The development of electricity prices
in a system dominated by CCGT technology is in turn largely
dependent on gas prices. In order to understand this relationship
better, a sensitivity analysis is executed for increasing and decreas-
ing gas prices. The gas price for the base scenario is set constant at
the current8 approximate price of 4 Eur/GJ. The Gas High scenario
has an annual growth rate of 2% while the Gas Low scenario has
one of 2%.92.5.3. Experiment setup: randomness and repetitions
Agent-based modelling in general, and this model in particular,
require multiple runs to arrive at statistically significant conclu-
sions. This is because two runs of the same scenario are differenti-
ated by randomness in the following parameters such as (a)
randomised agent iteration in order to prevent first-mover arte-
facts, (b) stochastic demand growth trends, randomness in initial
age of power plants, as the age is drawn from a uniform distribu-
tion between 0 and the technical lifetime of a power plant, and
finally (c) randomness in initial power plant ownership. After per-
forming a simple descriptive statistical test for the variance of
results, it was deemed that 40 repetitions were sufficient to obtain
statistically significant outcomes.8 June, 2016.2.6. Critical review of modelling assumptions
One assumption that impacts the analysis is that there are no
interconnections or storage in the system. This implies that as
the share of renewable production increases, a greater share of
the energy generated will not be consumed, due to spillage.9 This
leads to the cost effectiveness of a subsidy reducing over time, as
the share of renewable generation in the system increases, which
would not occur as sharply in the presence of storage or interconnec-
tions. Another important assumption is that the energy producers
construct a market clearing for one time point in the future and
extrapolate those revenues for the lifetime of the plant. This implies
that actual costs and benefit might be very different from those
expected. The next major assumption is that the regulator agent
has full knowledge of costs of technologies, and uses the same rates
of return as the energy producers. While this assumption may not
hold in reality, it helps to isolate and study the impacts of design ele-
ments better.3. Results and discussion
This section comprises of two subsections: the first consists of
the results as per the performance indicators mentioned in Sec-
tion 1.1. The performance indicators are effectiveness of policy,
and social welfare and distributional implications. The second con-
sists of a discussion and interpretation in Section 3.2, primarily in
terms of impacts of design elements. Condensing large sets of gran-
ular results to a few key indicators is a challenging activity, and
must be done carefully.3.1. Results
3.1.1. Effectiveness of policy
Effectiveness of policy is measured using two indicators: cost
effectiveness and target offset. Cost effectiveness is defined as total
subsidy cost per MW h of renewable electricity generated,10
summed across all 40 ticks, in Eur/MW h. It is then averaged across
all 40 repetitions of the scenario. Target offset measures the differ-
ence between the actual renewable energy generation and the
exogenously specified target. It is expressed as percentage, and then
averaged across all ticks and 40 repetitions per scenario.
targetOffset ¼
RrepRt
ðrGent;reptargett;repÞ100
targett;rep
nrep  ntick ð10Þ
Fig. 4 indicates these values for each scenario. The evolution of
capacity in each of the scenarios is shown in Fig. 5.Greater amounts of renewable energy will be generated when there is insufficient
demand for it.
10 All renewable energy technologies are considered.
Fig. 4. Policy effectiveness measured in subsidy costs and target achievement.
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under-achieved in scenarios P_Ante and P_AnteTS. This is, con-
cisely put, a consequence of the regulator agent’s short-
sightedness with respect to expectations of future electricity
prices.11 It is for the same reason that this is visible only in the
ex-ante scenarios, as there is no need to compute expected electric-
ity price in the ex-post scenarios. The effect is exacerbated in the
technology-specific scenario, as a price warranty is calculated for
each technology, while in the technology-neutral scenario, a price
warranty is only calculated for the marginal technology. It is useful
to note here that target achievement has little relation to the Average
Subsidy Cost/Unit, as the latter is normalised with respect to genera-
tion in MW h.
The results indicate the following:
(a) Quantity-warranty schemes are on average 4.5% more cost-
effective and meet their targets more consistently than their
price-warranty counterparts. This is because price-warranty
schemes induce investment in technologies up to the point
at which the realistic potential of a technology is reached,
and not the administrative target which is lesser than the
potential. Greater the amount of renewables in the portfolio,
greater the spillage12 and lower the generation. Therefore,11 This is because when the regulator agent calculates the required price warranty,
her expectation of revenue from the electricity price is calculated by taking into
account all the electricity plants that are expected at that moment. However, after
this calculation if investments do incur in the same tick, due to which the expected
electricity price drops, the regulator does not make a reassessment of revenue
expected from the electricity market for the same tick. Therefore, the regulator’s
assessment of revenue from the electricity market becomes higher than it actually is,
and the corresponding price warranty becomes lower than it needs to be, at the time
of investment.
12 Spillage can be defined as renewable capacity generating more than the demand
at a certain hour.unless there is an interconnector to a region with complemen-
tary demands during hours of spillage, or the presence of stor-
age, or demand response, the higher the share of renewables,
the lower the cost-effectiveness.
(b) Technology specific schemes are 60.3% more cost-effective
than their technology neutral counterparts. This is due to
windfall profits to non-marginal technologies in the technol-
ogy neutral scenarios.
(c) Ex-post schemes are 15.8% less cost effective than their ex-
ante counterparts. In the ex-ante schemes, the expectations
of revenues from electricity market are higher than actual,
over a twenty year period. The subsidy in ex-ante schemes
in the model therefore tend to be lower than necessary. This
result is sensitive to the future electricity prices; impacts of
high or low gas price scenarios can be observed in Fig. D.10a
and b.
3.1.2. Social welfare and distributional implications
The welfare implications are presented in Fig. 6, indicating the
change in welfare for the consumer, producer, government, and
total social welfare, for each scenario. The change is computed by
comparing each scenario with a base case, where no policy is
implemented. Change in consumer expenditure,13 change in pro-
ducer costs, and change in government expenditure are used as
proxies for calculating the changes in consumer, producer, and gov-
ernment welfares.
Overall, the results indicate that the greatest increase in social
surplus occurs in the scenario Q_AnteTS, where a technology-
specific, quantity-warranty, ex-ante scheme is implemented. The
results will now be detailed per welfare group. In all scenarios,
consumer welfare increases; this is primarily caused by a fall in
the average electricity prices due to the merit order effect. Govern-
ment welfare is only affected by the amount of subsidy spent. The
main design element affecting government welfare is therefore
technology specificity. Welfare is more negative in technology neu-
tral scenarios, compared to their corresponding technology-
specific counterparts due to the windfall profits mentioned earlier.
Producer surplus is affected by costs (fixed and variable) and
revenues (electricity spot market revenue and RES-E subsidies)
for various technologies. Fig. 7 shows the break up of producer sur-
plus per technology and per policy scenario, for all 40 years. In
technology-neutral scenarios, as one would expect, producer sur-
plus is high for non-marginal renewable technologies. Further-
more, for a certain capacity of RES-E capacity, the ex-ante
scenarios show lower surpluses than their ex-post counterparts.
This is again due to the overestimating of revenue from the elec-
tricity market by either the producer or the regulator. CCGT how-
ever shows a negative producer surplus in all scenarios.14
The cost-benefit impacts of each policy scenario on a single
technology, such as for instance Wind Offshore, is illustrated in
Fig. 8.3.2. Discussion and interpretation
In this subsection, the results from the previous section are
positioned in theory, and discussed in terms of their relevance to
the real-world.13 The Consumer agent in the model only spends on electricity costs, the subsidy is
assumed to be borne entirely by the government for the sake of the model. In reality
the cost burden is either borne by only the consumers of electricity or all tax payers.
14 This is because fixed O&M and variable costs of CCGT are consistently higher than
revenues from the electricity market. This is exacerbated by the fact that decommis-
sioning of power plants is age based (40 years) in the model, and not economic. In
addition, reducing average electricity prices due to the merit order effect also reduce
their revenue.
Fig. 5. Capacity growth in GW per policy scenario with time (in years) on x-axis.
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Quantity warranty schemes are more cost-effective than price-
warranty schemes, because price-warranty schemes induce invest-
ment in technologies up to the point at which the total potential of
a technology is reached. As explained, this result in the model is a
direct consequence of the lack of storage, demand response, or
interconnections. However, this indicates that control over quan-
tity is tenuous at best under price warranty schemes, unless there
are additional quantity-based measures in place. Given this, at
higher levels of penetration of RES-E, under pure price warranty
schemes, storage and/or demand response options hold utmost
importance.15 See Fig. D.11b to observe results for a scenario set where the RES-E generation
target remains constant at 10% of total consumption throughout the time-period.3.2.2. Technology-specificity vs technology-neutrality
Theoretically as pointed out by [11], two effects are possible:
the first is that expensive technologies are incentivised before their
time in technology-specific scenarios, therefore making technology
specificity more expensive, and the second is that cheap technolo-
gies do not get windfall profits in technology-specific scenarios,
therefore making those scenarios more cost-effective. In the case
of the Netherlands, it seems as if the second effect is much strongerthan the first, making the technology-neutral option more expen-
sive. This corroborates with the results of [11], where technology
neutral options incur almost twice as much the subsidy costs as
technology specific options. This effect would however not be evi-
dent if the targets were much lower, making the marginal technol-
ogy the cheapest one.15 Another factor which could impact this
result is if technology cost reductions are different than assumed.3.2.3. Ex-ante vs ex-post
Two effects could contribute to the impact of this design ele-
ment: the first is that there is a component of higher risk to the
producer in the ex-ante scenarios, therefore increasing their cost
of capital, and consequently their subsidy costs. The second effect
is that higher (lower) expectations of future electricity price than
reality lead to lower (higher) subsidy costs in ex-ante (ex-post)
scenarios. The results indicate that the second effect overtakes
the first. The isolated impact of the second effect can be seen in
Fig. D.11a. In this scenario set, the same risk aversion of 11% is
Fig. 6. Change in Welfare for producer, consumer, government, and society (total) in 40 years.
K.K. Iychettira et al. / Applied Energy 187 (2017) 228–242 237assumed in both ex-ante and ex-post scenarios (rEp is reduced to
zero in ex ante scenarios), under constant gas prices. The ex-ante
scenarios show an average of 4% decrease in subsidy costs in same
risk set compared to the base case set. This effectively quantifies
the impact of extra risk in ex-ante scenarios in the base case set.
Ex-post scenarios in the same risk scenario set are however 18%
more expensive than ex-ante scenarios to the government due to
the merit order effect. A comparison between base case scenario
set and the same-risk scenario set is shown in Table D.8.
This design element is highly sensitive to expectations of future
electricity prices, which in turn depend greatly upon the merit-Fig. 7. Producer Suplus per techorder effect of RES-E, and long term gas price development. Even
so, the absolute impact of this design element on policy cost effec-
tiveness or social welfare is at most half as significant as
technology-specificity vs neutrality. Therefore, while highly uncer-
tain, it does not impact the socio-technical system as much as
technology-neutrality does.
3.3. Applicability of the design element approach
By quantitatively demonstrating that mere design elements,
irrespective of the RES-E policy they belong to, have significantnology and policy scenario.
Fig. 8. Cost, revenue, subsidy, and profit for WindOffshore per MW h over 40 years.
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design element approach questions the current approach to policy
making and policy analysis in the realm of RES-E support in Eur-
ope. It takes the debate beyond a choice between say, an auction
or a feed-in-tariff, to ask how either should be designed in order
to achieve long term objectives of the system. While the concept
of whether renewable policies matter at all has been gaining trac-
tion off late in academic literature, [13], it remains distant from
ongoing policy discussions, as we elucidate below.
The 2014 State Aid Guidelines proposed that competitive bid-
ding, or auctions, should be the main form of support [41] for
utility scale renewable plants. This is proposed in the place of
the more popular price-based mechanisms in Europe. Competi-
tive bidding is modelled as ’quantity warranty’ in this work. This
research interestingly demonstrates that more than the feature
of competitive bidding or quantity warranty, the design element
technology specificity, would incur far greater implications in
terms of welfare distribution in the Netherlands, over a period
of 40 years.
Related to this, the fragmentation of the European internal elec-
tricity market due to country-specific renewable support schemes,
and security of supply policies is causing increasing concern [42].
Among the primary concerns of the European Commission now,
is to be able to promote renewable electricity without causing
unintended cross border impacts [43]. A part of their strategy to
address this seems to be to promote competitive bidding in mem-
ber states. However, it is possible that even competitive bidding,
when designed differently in neighbouring states (for instance interms of technology-specificity), could result in unintended cross
border effects. The design element method has the potential to
provide insight into which aspects of the policies need to be har-
monised (or not); and if yes, to what degree. This method allows
the analyst to examine, element-by-element, which of them lead
to cross-border interactions between two neighbouring countries
in the same electricity market.4. Conclusion
Most ongoing policy discussions relating to RES-E support
schemes, both within and outside of academia, compare existing
policies. However, two seemingly different policies can be
designed in a way that they have an equivalent effect on the mar-
ket: for instance, a tradable-green-certificate market with a long
term contract is similar to a tender. Conversely, two similar poli-
cies could have very different impacts on the system, if designed
slightly differently; for instance competitive bidding organised
specific to a technology would yield very different results from
one that is technology neutral. Therefore the core idea is that, it
is the design features that form the vital component of analysis,
and not the policies in their entirety. We employ core design ele-
ments and combine them to systematically arrive at a set of pos-
sible RES-E policy scenarios, considered complete with respect to
the design elements, thus exploring the complete policy design
space. The design elements modelled are quantity warranty vs.
price warranty, technology specificty vs. neutrality, and ex-ante vs.
K.K. Iychettira et al. / Applied Energy 187 (2017) 228–242 239ex-post price setting. We employ this design element view in com-
bination with agent based modelling to quantitatively assess
impacts of individual design elements on the socio-technical
system.
The results demonstrate that design elements, irrespective of
the RES-E policy they belong to, do have significant impacts on
the energy system and on welfare distribution, and therefore that
the approach is a useful one. The agent-based modelling frame-
work enables modelling of bounded rationalities in investment
decisions, allowing the modeller to incorporate real-world uncer-
tainties in agents’ behaviour. An important uncertainty in the real
world is that of long-term electricity price development. The
model interestingly demonstrates that accounting for future elec-
tricity prices ex-ante in the subsidy calculation may reduce the
overall cost of subsidy by about 15%, since the actors are likely to
overestimate the future electricity price. This is a consequence of
underestimating the impact of the merit order effect on expected
electricity prices over the long-term. Other significant results are
that technology specificity could reduce the cost of subsidy by up
to 60%. Results regarding the design element, quantity vs price war-
ranty corroborate established literature: quantity warranty helps
achieve targets better. The design element configuration that leads
to the highest increase in social welfare is the combination of
quantity-warranty, ex-ante accounting for electricity prices, and
technology-specificity.
With regard to policy implications, the State Aid Guidelines of
the European Commission promote competitive bidding to incen-
tivize investment, while largely supporting technology neutrality.
At the outset, our results corroborate with the choice of competi-
tive bidding. They however indicate that the feature technology
specificity has a significant implication on welfare impacts, subject
to the assumption of regulator’s knowledge of real costs being the
same as the energy producer. Differences in such features of RES-E
policy between member states could lead to unintended cross bor-
der effects. The design element method has the potential to pro-
vide insight into which aspects of the policies need to be co-
ordinated at the European level.Acknowledgements
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Other policy design elements for stimulation of RES-E in Europe.
Design Element Definition
Contract Length or Project
Duration
The length of time for which the contract is valid
Location Specificity This element would allow the differentiating of suppo
Size specificity This element would allow the differentiating of suppo
Cost burden The cost of the RES-E support could be borne either b
Cost containment
mechanisms
Adaptation of support levels to technology costs and s
caps, cost caps
Penalty for non compliance Penalties are means to deter non compliance of the re
Frequency of Change in
Warranty
The number of times the price or quantity signal chang
market the quantity warranty changes every year, how
constant as per the quantity warranty set onceAppendix A. Design elements
See Table A.3.Appendix B. Base model flowcharts
The two flowcharts in this section indicate the main algorithmic
processes in EMLab. Market clearing within one tick (year) is per-
formed using an annual load duration curve. The time resolution is
indeed yearly. However, the annual load duration curve, compris-
ing 8760 h of different loads, is approximated into twenty seg-
ments in view of computational resource constraints. Each
segment is represented by a pair of values: a load (in MW), and
period (in hours). For instance, segment 1 is (8160.778 MW,
17 h), segment 2 is (8390.36, 77 h) and so on. For each load seg-
ment, the electricity spot market is cleared individually according
to uniform price clearing, and price volume pairs are determined
for each of the 20 load segments.Appendix C. Data
C.1. Target and potential curves
The targets for renewable energy generation have been set by
extrapolating the targets mentioned in the National Renewable
Energy Action Plan of the Netherlands; [31].The trends in csv for-
mat are attached in the zipped folder.
Data points for ’realistic potentials’ at different years have been
used to linearly extrapolate trends for the whole time scope of the
model. The data points and their sources are mentioned in the
table below (see Tables C.4 and C.5).C.2. Assumptions: technology characteristics
See Tables C.6.Appendix D. Results
D.1. Figures
See Figs. D.10 and D.11.D.2. Tables
See Tables D.7 and D.8.rt levels by location
rt levels by size
y the consumers or by the tax payers (state budget)
tate budget related political feasibility concerns. Ex: capacity caps, generation
gulation
es over the lifetime of a power plant. For instance, in a tradable green certificate
ever, in a tender system, a contract ensures that the remuneration remains
Fig. B.9. Flowcharts showing the overall EMLab algorithm, and the investment algorithm.
Table C.4
Realistic technology potentials.
Technology Year Potential (in GW h) Source
Wind Onshore (2010, 2040) (2151.62,9032) [36]
Wind Offshore (2010, 2040) (837.27,58756) [36]
Photovoltaic (2013, 2020) (1065.19,10839.8) [37]
Table C.5
Demand and fuel price trends.
Growth Rate
Start value Mode Min Max
Electricity demand growth rate 1 1.1 0.99 1.03
Gas price – Basecase 4 1 1 1
Gas price – high 4 1.02 1.04 1
Gas price – low 4 0.98 0.96 1
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Table C.6
Assumptions regarding technologies.
Technology CCGT Wind Offshore PV Wind Onshore
Capacity [MW] 776 600 500 600
Construction time [Years] 2 1 1 1
Permit time [Years] 1 0 0 0
Technical lifetime [Years] 40 20 20 20
Depreciation time [Years] 15 20 20 20
Minimum Running hours 0 0 0 0
Fuels Natural Gas – – –
Table D.8
Comparison of average subsidy between base case set and same risk scenario set.
Base Case Scenario Same Risk Scenario
Scenario
Name
Avg Subsidy/Unit
(Eur/MW h)
Avg Subsidy/Unit
(Eur/MWh)
Difference
P_Ante 79.72 78.34 1.38
P_Post 93.39 93.11 0.28
P_AnteTS 27.88 27.24 0.64
P_PostTS 35.95 35.96 0.01
Q_Ante 74.08 69.32 4.76
Q_Post 78.67 76.09 2.58
Q_AnteTS 28.92 27.48 1.44
Q_PostTS 36.28 36.30 0.02
Table D.7
Distributional implications in million Eur.
Scenario D Consumer
Surpl.
D Producer
Surpl.
D Govt
Surpl.
D Social
Surpl.
P_Ante 46.91 61.86 74.66 89.61
P_AnteTS 18.12 3.39 10.73 4.00
P_Post 72.68 47.84 65.79 40.96
P_PostTS 71.06 13.15 30.27 27.64
Q_Ante 65.24 33.09 58.71 26.56
Q_AnteTS 65.45 2.23 26.49 36.73
Q_Post 65.34 36.61 61.91 33.19
Q_PostTS 65.32 7.71 31.73 25.89
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nario set with constant RES-E tar-
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Fig. D.11. Subsidy costs of scenarios addressing each effect on price setting individually.
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nario
0
30
60
90
P
_A
nt
e
P
_P
os
t
P
_A
nt
eT
S
P
_P
os
tT
S
Q
_A
nt
e
Q
_P
os
t
Q
_A
nt
eT
S
Q
_P
os
tT
S
Policy Scenario
S
ub
si
dy
 C
os
t i
n 
E
ur
/M
W
h
(b) Subsidy costs in Gas High sce-
nario
Fig. D.10. Subsidy costs in scenarios with increasing or decreasing gas price trends.
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